Oceangate Titan: analysis of an insultingly predictable failure

A preview of a world where ’regulation does not stifle innovation’. I wanted to clear up some points that have been widely misreported whilst discussing how mechanical failures of subsea vessels have been avoided for decades until now. This video could have been hours long if I spoke about everything in length, so consider it a brief summary. I speak in present tense during the video, but it was made public that the crew are deceased as the video was rendering. Despite the remarkable predictability of this failure, the families of the victims have my sympathy. Sources used: 2022 documentary showing previous dive Dave Lochridge court case against Oceangate Oceangate’s youtube channel (I doubt this will exist for much longer): @OceanGateInc James Cameron’s choice words about the incident: Alvin DSV abridged operating procedures. The entire WHOI site for Alvin was used for research: 07.9 ALVIN SUBSAFE: The US Navy’s comprehensive safety program for submarine’s. Originated from a broadly similar accident (USS Thresher) in the 1960’s): Web Site/Documents/Congress/House/OCTOBE~1/Sullivan opening An informed summary from someone with far far more experience than me: A Review on Structural Failure of Composite Pressure Hulls in Deep Sea Chapters: 00:00 Intro 02:40 Communicating Risk 05:10 ’The Hull Is Solid’ 11:05 ’Not Safety Critical’ 17:40 Other Factors